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The increasing share of retirees puts pressure on the shrinking working generation which will need to 
produce more output per worker to ensure a constant standard of living. We investigate the 
influence of a changing dependency ratio has on the time individuals spend in education and 
production. Longer education will increase productivity in the future, but will lower production in the 
short run, whereas an increase in labor input at the cost of education will provide more production 
immediately. We introduce a dependency ratio into a discrete-time Uzawa-Lucas model with 
international capital movements, human capital externalities and decreasing returns to labor in 
human capital formation. The dependency ratio is defined as the fraction between inactive and 
active individuals in regard to work or education. By calibration of the model, we find multiple steady 
states indicated by a u-shaped relation between education time-shares and the growth rate of the 
dependency ratio. Near the stable, high-level steady state, the optimal response to higher growth of 
the dependency ratio is more education to enhance productivity. We find evidence for this relation 
for 16 OECD countries. As a model extension, a debt-dependent interest rate has been introduced 
and estimated. 
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1 Introduction 
During the past decades concern has been raised towards the question whether and how 
the changing age structure in the USA, Europe, China and other countries will change 
economic behavior. Demographic change is caused by increased longevity on the one hand, 
and lower birth rates on the other (R. Lee, 2003). With increased longevity, a higher share of 
one’s lifetime is spent in retirement as long as the retirement age is constant. Lower birth 
rates cause a decreasing share of population who will later be able to generate output to 
support the rest of the population. Also, higher life expectancy drives up the dependency 
ratio independently. This may result in shortcomings in supporting the non-working 
members of society. Instead of analyzing the cause of demographic change, this paper looks 
at its effects on economic growth and education. Consequently, demographic change is 
conceptualized by analyzing the two major consequences of the transition; the increasing 
number of retirees and the decreasing workforce. One way to measure these dynamics is to 
look at the dependency ratio and its development. It indicates how many people need to be 
supported relative to the number of people who are working. This concept will be 
introduced into an Uzawa-Lucas growth model. 
Several studies have supported the pessimistic view of diminishing real output per capita 
and national savings rates due to population ageing within the next years if there is no 
impact on technical change (Bloom et al., 2010; Fayissa and Gutema, 2010; Hviding and 
Mérette, 1998; Muysken and Ziesemer, 2013, 2014). Wright et al. (2014) calculate the loss of 
per capita output caused by demographic change in absence of technological shifts to be 
more than 15% within the next 100 years. If the goal is to keep consumption per capita 
constant or even growing, production per worker needs to increase in order to keep up with 
the rising number of non-working members of the population. One way to increase 
production is to keep productivity per worker constant, but increase the time spent in 
production. The longer the production time, the more output can be generated with a 
constant productivity, implying a higher retirement age or more working hours per year. 
Another way is to increase the productivity of each worker and, hence, increase output per 
working-hour. This way, no extra time in production is needed, but this productivity increase 
comes at a cost. Workers need more education to learn how to produce more productively, 
indicating a higher time share devoted to education rather than production. The educational 
optimum is likely to change in times of ageing. Galasso (2008) analyzes the effect of a higher 
retirement age in several OECD countries, implying a constant educational share. His results 
are in favor of a higher retirement age, though, he neglects the possibility of a higher output 
through higher productivity. This paper focuses on the impact of the demographic change on 
education. The literature on the interaction of the demographic change and schooling is 
diverse. Through their vintage human capital model with a realistic survival law, Boucekkine 
et al. (2002) find that an increase in longevity results in longer schooling and a later 
retirement. The question remains, whether longer schooling is proportionate to the longer 
life span, or if there is a shift towards a higher or lower share of education. De la Croix and 
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Licandro (1999) show that an increasing life expectancy has a positive effect on the 
individual time devoted to schooling, but may have a negative effect on participation rates. 
We do not deal explicitly with life expectancy, retirement age, fertility, and working hours 
before retirement. They are included implicitly in the exogenous growth rates of labour and 
population which we use. Other things constant, an earlier retirement leads to a smaller 
labour force and a higher dependency ratio. Similarly, living longer without working longer 
has the same effect on the dependency ratio because population growth is higher because 
of a lower mortality rate. More children at pre-school age also enhance the dependency 
ratio. Our formulation of the ratio does not require making all these details explicit as 
microeconomics studies, demographers and pension funds usually do. Countries differ in all 
these details because of differences in institutions. We do not go into all the institutional 
details in the following literature discussion, but this literature points to the importance of 
institutional aspects regarding health, (public) education, labour (see retirements discussion 
in the introduction and section 4 below) and capital markets. (Hansen and Lønstrup, 2012) 
show for a utility maximizing household that without student loans and correspondingly less 
education, an increase in the probability to go to the third period, during which a retirement 
decision is taken, leads to less of an increase of savings than with student loans and 
therefore the final period’s utility is maximized by earlier rather than later retirement. 
Cervellati and Sunde (2013) extend this household decision model with a positive death 
probability in every period and perfect capital markets. In their model, decreasing mortality 
and reduction of labour time during the working period increase the benefits and reduce the 
opportunity costs of education. The resulting positive income effect yields more educated 
people and less labour supply. The latter is inessential for the impact of life expectancy on 
the share of people that receive schooling at given equilibrium wages represented by a 
Mincer equation. Cervellati and Sunde (2015a) add a decision on the hours spent on 
education to the schooling decision, but hours not spent on education cannot be invested in 
technical change because the demand side is not needed for the purpose of their paper. In 
contrast, the problem of ageing is to cause a general equilibrium effect of an increased 
dependency ratio driving up wages for human capital, and reducing labour demand of 
producers and providing a stronger incentive, but also leading to larger opportunity costs for 
a shifting time input into education. In a general equilibrium model by Cervellati and Sunde 
(2015b) fertility does not feedback into education, and because technical change is a 
byproduct of education it is not possible to move a factor out of production of output into 
that of technical change as both are increasing with the share of educated people when the 
economy is in a developed stage; once all people have education technical change is at a 
fixed rate. In the models of Cervelatti and Sunde (2015a,b) and Bonneuil and Boucekkine 
(2014) life expectancy has an impact on public education under high life expectancy, low 
mortality and fertility, but in both no other strategy like capital accumulation under 
international capital movements, or investing in technical change exists. In the Uzawa-Lucas 
model, which we use, shifting labour from production of output to that of human capital, 
identical to technical change, is possible. Decreasing returns to education time in human 
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capital formation and human capital externalities in final output production become crucial. 
Empirically, the positive effects dominate and education is enhanced. This generates 
technical change under an infinite horizon including all future generations. Limited life 
expectancy and mortality appear in our model only implicitly in the form of a positive rate of 
depreciation of human capital. What matters in the end for all countries’ ageing, is the 
dependency ratio and its growth, unless one is interested in the details of the distribution 
across a continuum of generations, which is beyond the scope of this paper. As a byproduct 
of not using life expectancy and fertility, in our empirical parts we do not have to choose 
between different measures of life expectancy (age 5 or at birth) and mortality (adult, 
maternal, at working age, under 5, or infant), which have theoretically ambiguous and 
empirically controversial effects (Hazan, 2012).1  
Therefore, in this paper a dependency ratio, defined as the population/labour ratio without 
the explicit modeling of the underlying age distribution, is introduced into a discrete-time 
Uzawa-Lucas model (Frenkel et al., 1996; Lucas, 1988; Uzawa, 1965) with capital 
movements, decreasing returns to labor in human capital formation, and human capital 
externalities in final output production to find out how the economy reacts to the new 
challenges. We find two optimal shares of education. In the lower steady state, the economy 
faces high participation rates in production with relatively little time in education, whereas 
the other steady state is characterized by high schooling. The latter one is stable. We are 
specifically interested in the optimal share of education and its implied effects on the 
economy, in particular its level and growth of productivity. A virtuous circle of education and 
productivity in connection with favorable demographic trends is most popular in the 
literature explaining the escape from per-industrial low income and growth. For example in 
the model of Becker et al. (1990) a human capital shock leads to lower fertility and a lower 
discount rate per child but a higher discount rate for all children together, which induces a 
reduction of a high number of children in favour of more education for each child, leading to 
more growth and less fertility again. Similarly, in the model by Cervellati and Sunde (2005) 
an improvement in life expectancy encourages human capital formation, which increases 
technical progress, which in turn encourages more human capital formation. In contrast, in 
our model for rich countries an unfavourable development of ageing triggers an increase in 
education and productivity.        
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the model will be set up. Section 3 analyzes 
the existence and stability of multiple steady states. Section 4 will introduce the data for the 
dependency ratio and the share in education, and shows the relation between the model 
and the data. Section 5 addresses the dynamics of foreign debt and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
1
 The complications stem from the diverse causes of the change in life expectancy. Hansen (2013) suggests that 
in regression analysis of the effect of life expectancy on schooling life expectancy should be instrumented by its 
causes, medical innovations related to childhood diseases (Hansen 2013);  Cervellati and Sunde (2013) 
emphasize the shifting peak towards higher age of the survival distribution during working age. 
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2 The Model 
We use a model by Frenkel et al. (1996), which is a  discrete-time version of the Uzawa-Lucas 
with perfect international capital movements and non-increasing returns to labor2 in human 
capital formation. Besides allowing for imperfect capital movements, we introduce 
exogenous growth rates of the active population and the total population. This will show 
how the long run outcome evolves if there is a discrepancy between the two rates, 
indicating demographic changes. They will be varied numerically to see the effect on the 
allocation and growth of the economy. The economy consists of representative households 
and firms maximizing their respective utility and profits.  
The output of the economy is determined by capital, 𝐾𝑡, and human capital, 𝐻𝑡, and formed 
by a Cobb-Douglas production function, where human capital, 𝐻𝑡 = ℎ𝑡𝐿𝑡, is the number of 
the members in the active population, 𝐿𝑡, times their respective skill level, ℎ𝑡. With the total 
population denoted as 𝑁𝑡, the dependency ratio is defined as the inactive population over 
the active population, 𝐷𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡−𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡
. The active population is defined as the part of the 
population that is actively engaged in either the production of output, or education. The 
inactive population contains all others. This definition can be rearranged in terms of 𝐿𝑡 to 
see how the active population interacts with the dependency ratio, 𝐿𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
. For a given 
population size, the active population decreases if the dependency ratio increases. Replacing 
this in the previous definition for total human capital gives: 𝐻𝑡 = ℎ𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
. The production 
function then is: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐾𝑡)
1−𝛼 ((1 − 𝑒𝑡)ℎ𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
)
𝛼
ℎ?̅?
𝜖
    (1) 
The productivity level, 𝐴, is assumed to be constant and ℎ𝑡 may grow. The 𝐿𝑡 agents in this 
economy decide to spend their time either in education 𝑒𝑡 , or production (1 −  𝑒𝑡). 
Equivalently, we can think of 𝑒𝑡 as the share of the active population in education and 
(1 − 𝑒𝑡) as the share in production in a given time frame (i.e. one year). By implication, our 
definition of the variable 𝐿𝑡 deviates from the standard labour market definition, where the 
active population does not include those in education. We do this because classifying them 
as inactive would ignore the fact that this part of the labour time contributes a period later 
via human capital to output production, whereas the difference between 𝑁𝑡 and 𝐿𝑡 remains 
inactive. 𝑁𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡 can be interpreted as the number of old people who will not return to 
schooling because they are too old. Average human capital ℎ?̅?
𝜖
 contributes to the 
productivity of all factors and is modeled after Lucas (1988). As no single person can 
influence average human capital, the representative optimizing agent takes the externality 
ℎ?̅?
𝜖
 as given when deciding on their optimal time spent in education, which leads to a 
                                                          
2
 Uzawa (1965) also used decreasing returns; Lucas (1988) simplified to assuming constant returns in order to 
allow for an explicit solution for the long-term growth rates in equilibrium and optimum. 
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second best solution. Hence, what we call an optimal solution is in fact a second best 
solution. Through including externalities of human capital formation into the production 
function for final output there may be two steady states for each growth rate of the 
dependency ratio. Xie (1994) establishes the possibility of multiple steady states for a large 
enough external effect of human capital. By implication, it is an empirical question, whether 
education should be increased or decreased in response to ageing. In general, preferences, 
technologies, endowments and institutions play a role in this decision. In the Uzawa-Lucas 
model, there is a special role of a positive human capital externality in final output 
production, which encourages human capital production from the demand side, but there is 
also a decreasing marginal effect of more education time in human capital formation, which 
discourages human capital formation. The question of which one is stronger, is not obvious 
without theoretical and empirical investigation in a multiple steady state model connecting 
them to other assumptions on preferences, technologies, endowments of active and inactive 
population parts, and institutional assumptions. In our model, we do not consider health 
aspects, education is a private decision, capital markets are perfect up to the interest rate 
mark up when the debt/GDP ratio increases; the labour market is Walrasian up to the 
human capital externality on the demand side.    
The consumer in this economy owns physical and human capital which (s)he supplies to the 
production sector. The demand for these is determined by the firms which solve a static 
maximization program:  
max(1−𝑒𝑡),𝐾𝑡 π = A(𝐾𝑡 )
1−𝛼 ((1 − 𝑒𝑡)ℎ𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
)
𝛼
ℎ?̅?
𝜖
− 𝜔𝑡(1 − 𝑒𝑡)ℎ𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
− 𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐾𝑡   (2) 
The first term on the RHS is the output of the firms, the second term is the cost of wages and 
the third term is the cost of capital. 
The first-order conditions for (1 − 𝑒𝑡) and 𝐾𝑡 are  
 𝜔𝑡 =
𝛼𝑌𝑡
(1−𝑒𝑡)ℎ𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
   (3) 
 𝑟𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
   (4) 
In (3) the equilibrium consequences of an increase in the dependency ratio are observable. If 
the dependency ratio increases, ceteris paribus, equilibrium wages will also increase. 
Alternatively, for given wages and output, either time spent in production goes up (increase 
in (1 − 𝑒𝑡)), or individual human capital increases over time. An increase in human capital 
can be obtained by spending more time in education (see equation (6) below). Here the 
ambivalence of how time should be optimally spent becomes clear. 
 Optimal Education in Times of Ageing  
7 
 
The consumers’ utility is given by an isoelastic utility function, 𝑈𝑡 = ∑ β
𝑡𝑁𝑡  
𝑐𝑡
1−𝜎
(1−𝜎)
∞
𝑡=0
 , with 
0 < 𝛽 < 1 as the subjective discount factor and 𝜎 > 0 as the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption.  
The consumers’ budget constraint is 
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝑘)𝐾𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡(1 − 𝑒𝑡)ℎ𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
+ 𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡+1 − (1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
)) 𝐵𝑡   (5) 
Where expenses for consumption in period 𝑡, 𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡, and savings, 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝑘)𝐾𝑡, must 
equal the income from wages, 𝜔𝑡(1 − 𝑒𝑡)
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
ℎ𝑡, and capital, 𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐾𝑡, plus the borrowings, 
𝐵𝑡+1 , minus the debt service, (1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
))𝐵𝑡 . The interest rate 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
)  is an increasing 
function of the debt to GDP ratio. For now, 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
)  is assumed to be constant. This 
assumption will be relaxed in Section 5 in which a realistic function of 𝑟(
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
) will be 
estimated. Taking care of the impact of the debt/GDP ratio on the interest rate can be 
interpreted as a household or government activity. But as there is no other separate 
government activity we integrate this task into the household decision assuming households 
take care of their impact on the interest rate. As there is only one household who owns the 
firm it can also take over this small government task. Moreover, the household cares for the 
old. As we do not have many heterogeneous households we do not have to decide on which 
pension model to use. All real-world pension models have been mis-designed and all ran into 
problems whenever ageing came about. Designing pension fund models is beyond the scope 
of this paper. The only assumption we make in this regard is that the utility function below 
has the same per capita consumption for the inactive 𝑁𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡 (old and pre-school children) 
and the active 𝐿𝑡 (young, working and in school).
3           
Human capital formation is described as 
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾ℎ𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡   (6) 
𝐹 is the knowledge efficiency coefficient, 𝛿ℎ is the depreciation rate of human capital and 𝛾 
is the productivity parameter, with  𝛾 ≤ 1, to assure diminishing or constant returns to 
education time. 
The consumers maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint (5) and the 
development of human capital (6) for given initial values 𝐾0, ℎ0, 𝐵0. 
                                                          
3
 Muysken and Ziesemer (2014) assume that the proportion of consumption of old and young is fixed, but not 
necessarily unity.  
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max
𝑐𝑡,𝑒𝑡,𝐵𝑡+1,𝐾𝑡+1,ℎ𝑡+1
∑ β𝑡 (𝑁𝑡  
𝑐𝑡
1−𝜎
(1 − 𝜎)
∞
𝑡=0
− 𝝁𝒕   [𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝑘)𝐾𝑡 − 𝜔𝑡(1 − 𝑒𝑡)
𝑁𝑡
1 + 𝐷𝑡
ℎ𝑡 − 𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐾𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡+1
+ (1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
)) 𝐵𝑡]  − 𝝁𝒉𝒕 [ℎ𝑡+1 − 𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾  ℎ𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡 ]) 
The first order conditions are: 
ct:      𝑐𝑡
−𝜎 = 𝜇𝑡  (7) 
et:        𝜇𝑡𝜔𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
= 𝜇ℎ𝑡𝐹 𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
  (8) 
Bt+1:   𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽𝜇𝑡+1 (1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)) + 𝛽𝜇𝑡+1
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
 𝑟′ (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)  (9) 
Kt+t:   𝜇𝑡 = 𝛽𝜇𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘𝑡+1)   (10) 
ht+1:  𝜇ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽 [𝜇𝑡+1𝜔𝑡+1(1 − 𝑒𝑡+1)
𝑁𝑡+1
1+𝐷𝑡+1
+ 𝜇ℎ𝑡+1𝐹𝑒𝑡+1
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ)𝜇ℎ𝑡+1]  (11) 
The following transversality conditions must hold4: 
I. lim𝑡→∞ 𝛽
𝑡𝜇𝑡𝐾𝑡 = 0  
II. lim𝑡→∞ 𝛽
𝑡𝜇ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 0  
Equations (1)-(11) define a system of 11 equations for 10 endogenous variables, 
𝑌𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, ℎ𝑡, 𝑒𝑡, 𝜔𝑡, 𝑟𝑘𝑡, 𝑐𝑡, 𝐵𝑡, 𝜇𝑡, and 𝜇ℎ𝑡. Due to Euler’s theorem, equations (1)-(4) are linearly 
dependent, if (2) equals zero. Hence, one of them ((2) in this case) can be dropped from the 
system. This leaves 10 variables and 10 equations. From the 10x10 equation system we can 
derive the rates of return to physical capital, bonds and human capital. 
1
𝛽
(
𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
)
𝜎
=
𝜇𝑡
𝛽 𝜇𝑡+1
= 𝑅𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝐻𝑡+1    (12a) 
𝑅𝐵𝑡+1 = 1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) (1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏)  (12b) 
𝑅𝐾𝑡+1 = 1 − 𝛿𝑘 + (1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
                      (12c) 
𝑅𝐻𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑔𝜔)
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
   𝐹𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1 [1 − 𝑒𝑡+1 +
1
𝛾
𝑒𝑡+1 +
1−𝛿ℎ
𝐹𝛾𝑒𝑡+1
𝛾−1]  (12d) 
The first equation in (12a) is derived from (7) and the other expressions follow from (12b-d), 
as equations (9), (10) and (11) are rearranged to equal 
𝜇𝑡
𝛽 𝜇𝑡+1
. Equation (12b) is derived from 
                                                          
4
 For proof that the utility function has a finite integral, and hence has an interior maximum see Appendix A. 
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(9) with 𝜂𝑟𝑏 =
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑟′(
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)
𝑟(
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)
, (12c) is derived from (10) where 𝑟𝑘𝑡+1  is replaced by the 
expression in (4) and equation (12d) is derived by (11) where 𝜇ℎ𝑡 is replaced by the relation 
in (8). 
Because 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) is assumed to be constant for now 𝑟′ (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) = 0. This leads to 𝜂𝑟𝑏 = 0. For 
completeness of the model and because it will become crucial in later sections, the 𝜂𝑟𝑏term 
is still carried along and will be set to zero whenever necessary. (12b) implies a constant 
growth rate of 𝑐𝑡 for constant interest rate 𝑟, which implies constant 𝑅𝐾𝑡+1 and 𝑅𝐻𝑡+1 in 
(12c) and (12d).  
This implies constancy of 
𝑌𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
 in (12c), from which follows that output and capital grow at 
the same rate. It follows that 
𝑌𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
= 𝐴 (
𝐾𝑡+1
(1−𝑒𝑡+1)ℎ𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
1+𝐷𝑡+1
)
−𝛼
ℎ̅𝑡+1
𝜖
  must be constant. 
Hence, we can derive how the growth rates of 𝐾𝑡, 𝑒𝑡  and  ℎ𝑡  are related. Note that 
ℎ̅𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑡+1 since ℎ̅𝑡+1 is the average human capital of identical households. This implies 
𝑌𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
= 𝐴 (
𝐾𝑡+1
(1−𝑒𝑡+1)ℎ𝑡+1
1+
𝜖
𝛼 𝑁𝑡+1
1+𝐷𝑡+1
)
−𝛼
  
Constancy implies equality of the growth rates of the numerator and the denominator: 
1 + 𝑔𝑌 =  1 + 𝑔𝐾 = (1 + 𝑔1−𝑒)(1 + 𝑔ℎ)
1+
𝜖
𝛼
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
   (12c)I 
(12c)I shows the growth rate of capital in relation to the growth rates of time spent in 
production, (1 − 𝑒𝑡),  individual human capital,  ℎ𝑡 , from (6), population,  𝑁𝑡 and the 
dependency ratio, (1 + 𝐷𝑡). An increase in the growth rate of the dependency ratio 
decreases the growth rate of capital, ceteris paribus. This can, once again, either be offset by 
increasing the growth rate of time spent in production (which is clearly only a short term 
measure, as time spent in production cannot exceed 100%), or by increasing the growth rate 
of human capital. This can be increased by increasing 𝑒𝑡, the share of education (see (6)).  
(12c)I shows the trade-off of time spent in the different sectors when keeping 𝑔𝐾 constant.  
Equation (12d) is the central equation to find a steady state expression for 𝑒𝑡. (3) implies: 
1 + 𝑔𝜔 =
1+𝑔𝑌
(1+𝑔1−𝑒)(1+𝑔ℎ)
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
  (3)I 
It has been established above that output and capital grow at the same rate, inserting (12c)I 
into (3)I leads to: 
1 + 𝑔𝜔 = (1 + 𝑔ℎ)
𝜖
𝛼   (3)II 
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Together with (6) this shows that 𝑔𝜔is constant if 𝑒𝑡 is constant (i.e. if 𝑔𝑒 = 0). (1 + 𝑔𝜔) can 
be replaced in (12d) to relate 𝑒𝑡 and 𝑒𝑡+1 to only exogenous variables:  
𝑅𝐻𝑡+1   = (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ) )
𝜖
𝛼 1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
 𝐹𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1 [(1 − 𝑒𝑡+1) +
1
𝛾
𝑒𝑡+1 +
(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾𝑒𝑡+1
𝛾−1]  (12d)
I 
As this expression includes time spent in education of the current and future period, no 
analysis can be done yet about their behavior in and around the steady state. To do this 𝑒𝑡 
will be linked to its growth rate. Multiplying 𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
 into the brackets yields:  
𝑅𝐻𝑡+1  = (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼 1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
 𝐹𝛾 [𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1 − 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑒𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 1
𝛾
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑒𝑡
+ (
𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡+1
)
𝛾−1 (1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]     
Using  
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑒𝑡
= 1 + 𝑔𝑒we get: 
𝑅𝐻𝑡+1   = (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼 1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
 𝐹𝛾 [𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1 − 𝑒𝑡
𝛾(1 + 𝑔𝑒) + 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 1
𝛾
(1 + 𝑔𝑒) +
(
1
1+𝑔𝑒
)
𝛾−1 (1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]                           (12d)II 
With 𝑅𝐻𝑡+1 constant, the RHS of (12d)
II is constant as well. This is the dynamic equation that 
shows how 𝑒𝑡  develops over time, depending on several parameters and exogenous 
variables. Note that 𝑔𝑁, 𝑔1+𝐷 and all parameters are exogenous and constant. With help of 
this equation, the stability of 𝑒𝑡 in the steady state can be analyzed. Unfortunately, the 
above expression cannot be solved for 𝑒𝑡, or 𝑔𝑒 analytically. In the next section the model 
will be calibrated to find and analyze the steady state conditions. 
3 Existence and Partial Stability of Multiple Steady States 
In this section the relation between 𝑔𝑒 and 𝑒𝑡  will be analyzed. By calibration of the model 
two steady states are found. The RHS of the steady state condition (12d)II is constant if either 
𝑔𝑒 = 0 and hence 𝑒𝑡 is constant.  
Understanding the interactions between 𝑔𝑒  and 𝑒𝑡  is crucial for finding possible steady 
states. Since (12d)II can neither be solved for 𝑔𝑒 nor for 𝑒𝑡, it needs to be differentiated 
implicitly to find how the relationship behaves. (13) shows the derivative of 𝑔𝑒 with respect 
to 𝑒𝑡.
5 
𝑔𝑒
′ =
−
𝜖
𝛼
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+(1−𝛿ℎ))
−1
𝐹𝛾 𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
[𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
−𝑒𝑡
𝛾
(1+𝑔𝑒)+𝑒𝑡
𝛾1
𝛾
(1+𝑔𝑒)+(
1
1+𝑔𝑒
)
𝛾−1(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]−[(𝛾−1)𝑒𝑡
𝛾−2
−𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
(1+𝑔𝑒)+𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
(1+𝑔𝑒)]
[−𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+𝑒𝑡
𝛾1
𝛾
+(1−𝛾)(1+𝑔𝑒)
−𝛾 (1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]
  
(13) 
                                                          
5
 The full derivation is in Appendix B. 
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For our purposes it proves helpful to do a full analysis of this relation. To find a turning point 
(maximum, or minimum), 𝑔𝑒
′ = 0 is required: 
−
𝜖
𝛼
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
−1
𝐹𝛾 [𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝛾(1 + 𝑔
𝑒
) (
1
𝛾
− 1) + (
1
1+𝑔𝑒
)
𝛾−1
(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
] = (1 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔
𝑒
− 𝑒𝑡
−1)    (13)I  
This is the most this equation can be simplified without making assumptions about the 
magnitude of the parameters. Some parameters are set in the literature. The following 
common values have been applied: 𝛼 = 0.6 and 𝛿ℎ = 0.03. Lucas (1988) calibrates 𝜖  to US 
data for the case 𝛾 = 1. As we use 𝛾 < 1, in order to get empirically realistic results we will 
use twice Lucas’ assumption and set 𝜖 = 0.834, which is necessary when the rate of 
depreciation for human capital is not zero and 𝛾 < 1.6 Alternatively, we could have set a 
smaller rate of depreciation and/or a higher 𝛾 explained next. 𝐹 and 𝛾 are interdependent 
through equation (6) for given other parameters and data. In order to find reasonable values 
for 𝐹 and 𝛾 to fulfill condition (6) for given data, 𝑔ℎ is set to 0.011, close to Denison’s 
estimate for the United States (Denison, 1962), also used by Lucas. Finding combinations of 
values for 𝐹 and 𝛾, which satisfy equation (6) is done for given 𝑒. We set the current value to 
= 0.334 , the panel mean of 16 OECD countries for the period 1985 to 2010  (see next 
section for details on data). For our purposes, from a set of combinations of values of data 
for 𝐹 and 𝛾 we choose 𝐹 = 0.055 and 𝛾 = 0.268 (see Appendix C for justification) to ensure 
greatest possible similarity between the simulation and data analysis in Section 4 below. 
Whereas Mankiw et al. (1992) assume the same rate of depreciation for physical and human 
capital, Lucas (1988) clearly prefers a lower one for human capital because of the 
intergenerational transfer of knowledge and sets it equal to zero. In the remainder of this 
paper, we follow Mankiw et al. (1992) and set the depreciation rate of human capital equal 
to the depreciation rate of physical capital, 𝛿ℎ = 𝛿𝑘 = 0.03. In Appendix D however, we take 
an intermediate position to show that the choice of the rate of depreciation affects the 
adequate discount rate and the values of the solution of the model only marginally. We also 
set , 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) = 0.05 and 𝑔𝑁 = 0.002,in line with the literature for OECD countries. For the 
steady state, and in line with the panel average of 16 OECD countries 1985 to 2010, it is 
reasonable to assume that the growth rate of the dependency ratio will be stable, while 
ageing populations are possibly a transitional phenomenon. Hence, we set 𝑔1+𝐷 = 0. This 
assumption will be relaxed later on. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 An implication of these assumptions is that we do not get an indeterminacy result for ε > α as the literature 
does under the assumptions made by Lucas (Benhabib and Perli, 1994; Xie, 1994). 
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                           Figure 1 – Dynamics in 𝒆𝒕     Figure 2 – Growth rate of the activity ratio 
These values are inserted into (13)I, which then can be solved for 𝑒𝑡 = 0.354. This shows 
that there is a single value at which 𝑔𝑒’ = 0, which must then be the only maximum, or 
minimum of the function (12d)II. With the given parameters and the assumption 𝑔𝑒 =
 𝑔1+𝐷 =  0, the roots of function (12d)
II are found to be 𝑒1 = 0.305 or 𝑒2 = 0.380. As 𝑔𝑒’ is 
negative for 𝑒𝑡 > 𝑒2 and positive for 𝑒𝑡 < 𝑒2, 𝑔𝑒 is positive according to (12d)
II for values of 
the parameters presented above and of 𝑒𝑡 below 𝑒2 and above 𝑒1, and negative above 𝑒2 
and below 𝑒1, the possibility of a minimum can be excluded, as it would require the opposite 
values of 𝑔𝑒 and 𝑔𝑒’ for the respective regions. This establishes that the function (12d)
II must 
have a maximum at 𝑒𝑡 = 0.354 in the 𝑔𝑒 − 𝑒 plane. Figure 1 can then be drawn in the 
𝑔𝑒 − 𝑒 plane with a maximum at 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.354, and roots at 𝑒1 = 0.305 or 𝑒2 = 0.380. 
Because 𝑔𝑒 is the growth rate of 𝑒𝑡, the stability of both steady states can be evaluated. 
𝑒2 = 0.380 is stable and 𝑒1 = 0.305 is not, again because 𝑔𝑒 is positive for values of 𝑒𝑡 
below 𝑒2 and above 𝑒1, and negative above 𝑒2 and below 𝑒1. Once out of the steady state, 
the economy will always return to 𝑒2 if the starting point is to the right of 𝑒1. This shows the 
existence of multiple steady states with a stable one at 𝑒2 = 0.380 for the parameters 
indicated above.  
The steady state value of 𝑒  can be interpreted in two different ways as the labour 
endowment can be seen as total hours available for work and education or as total number 
of persons on a job or in education. It is either the time share each individual spends in 
education per year, or the share of the active persons in the population that is engaged in 
education in a given year. As we have to link it to the available data, we prefer the second 
interpretation, as it gives a more exact indication in times of changing demographics and it is 
closer to the spirit of the model. 𝑒2 = 0.380 can then be interpreted as 38% of the active 
population are engaged in education and, hence, 62% are in production in the steady state. 
The data for education time that we use below includes continuous vocational training and 
on the job training.  
0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40
0.00010
0.00005
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
e
0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
0.0010
0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
e 𝑒 𝑒  
𝑔1+𝐷  𝑔𝑒  
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In the model there are 10 endogenous variables: 𝑌𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, ℎ𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡, 𝜔𝑡, 𝑟𝑘𝑡, 𝑐𝑡, 𝐵𝑡, 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜇ℎ𝑡. Their 
growth rates need to be determined within the model. The numerical values of the stable 
steady state will be derived. In addition to values chosen above, the value for 𝜎 is set to 
1.067 and 𝛽 = 0.982. 
The steady state values in Table 1 indicate that an increase in the growth rate of the 
dependency ratio 𝑔1+𝐷 starting from zero, leads to a decrease in the growth rates of output, 
capital and the shadow price of human capital in the long run, ceteris paribus.  
Steady State Relations From Equation Numerical 
𝟏 + 𝒈𝒀 = (𝐹 𝑒2
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
1+
𝜖
𝛼 (
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
)  
(1),  (12c)I, (6)  𝒈𝒀   = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑𝟏  
𝟏 + 𝒈𝑲 = (𝐹 𝑒2
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
1+
𝜖
𝛼 (
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
)  
(12c)I, (1), (6) 𝒈𝑲   = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑𝟏  
𝟏 + 𝒈𝒉 = 𝐹 𝑒2
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ)  (6) 𝒈𝒉    = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟏  
𝟏 + 𝒈𝝎 = (𝐹 𝑒2
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼
  
  (3)II, (6) 𝒈𝝎   = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟕   
𝟏 + 𝒈𝝁 = (𝛽 (1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) (1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏)))
−1
   
(9) 𝒈𝝁    = −𝟎. 𝟎𝟑𝟎  
𝟏 + 𝒈𝝁𝒉 =
1
𝛽(1+𝑟(
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)(1+𝜂𝑟𝑏))
(𝐹 𝑒2
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼  
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
   
(8) 𝒈𝝁𝒉  = −𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟐  
𝟏 + 𝒈𝒄 = [𝛽 (1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) (1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏))]
1
𝜎
  
(7) and (9) 𝒈𝒄    = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟗   
Table 1 - Steady states 
Note to Table 1: 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) (1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏) = 0.05, 𝛼 = 0.6, 𝛿ℎ = 0.03, 𝑔𝑁 = 0.002, 𝑔1+𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 = 0.055, 𝛾 =
0.268, 𝜖 = 0.834, 𝜎 = 1.06, 𝛽 = 0.982 and 𝑒2 = 0.380. For the transversality conditions to hold, the growth 
rate of 𝛽𝑡𝜇𝑡𝐾𝑡 and 𝛽
𝑡𝜇𝑡ℎ𝑡 must be negative. With 𝛽 = 0.982, the growth rate of 𝛽
𝑡 is -0.018. With 𝑔𝜇 =
−0.030 and 𝑔𝐾 = 0.031, the growth rate of the first expression is negative. The growth rate of the second 
product is also negative because 𝑔𝜇ℎ = −0.012 and 𝑔ℎ = 0.011. The transversality conditions are, hence, 
fulfilled. 
 
The detailed calculations of Table 1 can be understood as follows in connection with the 
parameter values below Table 1. The growth rate for human capital ℎ follows from (6), using 
the steady state value 𝑒2 = 0.38. Equation (12c)’ together with the assumption of a constant 
interest rate and the underlying debt/GDP ratio, leads to a constant capital-output ratio; 
using the production function and again the previous result from (6) yields the growth rates 
for Y and K. The result from (6) in (3)’’ yields the growth rate of wages. The growth rate for 
the marginal utility of income, 1 + 𝑔𝜇, follows directly from (9). The latter result together 
with (8) and the growth rates for wage and human capital yield the growth rate of the value 
of the shadow price of human capital. Finally, (7) and (9) yield the growth rate of 
consumption. The constancy of all these growth rates depends on those of the labour share 
in education 𝑒, the debt/GDP ratio, 𝑔𝑁 and 𝑔1+𝐷. Existence, uniqueness and stability of the 
consumption and debt part of the steady state of the model will be discussed in Section 5.   
                                                          
7
 Climate change papers use values between one and two. Denk and Weber (2011) use 2,5 as value for 𝜎. We 
use 1.06 to ensure stability in the debt dynamics in Section 5. 
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In Figure 1, the steady state was analyzed for 𝑔1+𝐷 = 0. If this assumption is relaxed, the 
relation between steady state values for 𝑒 and 𝑔1+𝐷 can be plotted using (12d)
II as in Figure 
2 above for 𝑔𝑒 = 0 and given values of 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) (1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏), 𝑔𝑁, 𝛼, 𝛿ℎ, 𝐹, 𝛾 and 𝜖. 
The u-shaped curve of Figure 2 reflects the two steady-state time shares of education for 
each growth rate of the activity ratio. The active population can either be less educated and 
spend more time in production to increase output or invest more time in education and be 
more productive in the future. As has been analyzed in this section, the stable steady states 
are on the upward sloping part, indicating a higher optimal share of education for a higher 
growth rate of the activity ratio if only taking stable equilibria into account. 
Xie (1994) sees the reason for multiple steady states in the effects of the externality (𝜖). By 
disentangling the effects of the externality and the diminishing returns to time spent in 
human capital formation (𝛾), it becomes clear that the interaction of these two parameters 
is vital to the existence of the two steady states. The contribution of both will be shown by 
setting first only 𝜖 equal to zero and second only 𝛾 equal to one.  
Figure 3a shows the steady-state relationship (for constant 𝑔𝑒) between 𝑔1+𝐷 and 𝑒𝑡 with 
constant returns to  time spent in human capital formation (𝛾 = 1) but positive externality 
and all other parameters as in Table 1. By setting 𝛾 equal to one, the relationship becomes 
almost linear and upward sloping,8 indicating an unambiguous increase in the share of 
education if the growth rate of the activity ratio increases.9 For a stable activity ratio the 
steady state share of education is 0.023, suggesting an unrealistically low share in education 
when compared with the data considered in detail in the next section. Gruescu (2006) also 
finds a linear relationship between the growth rate of the dependency ratio and the time 
shares. In her model she considers neither the externality effect, nor diminishing returns to 
education time in human capital formation. However, when the more realistic case of 
decreasing returns is allowed for as we do here, the education policy decision is complicated 
by a non-linearity implying multiple steady states. This requires ruling out the policy 
alternative of increasing labor input in production and decreasing it in education as shown in 
Figure 3b and above in Figures 1 and 2, where an increase in 𝑔1+𝐷 has two possible 
reactions. Figure 3b displays the steady-state relationship (for constant 𝑔𝑒) between 𝑔1+𝐷 
and 𝑒𝑡 if the externality effect is set to zero, but diminishing returns to time spent in human 
capital formation are present. Without the externality effect of human capital, the 
relationship between the share of education and the growth rate of the activity ratio is 
negative. With diminishing returns to time spent in human capital formation and no positive 
externalities it is not profitable anymore to invest more time in education in times of ageing. 
                                                          
8
 The exact formula is 𝑔1+𝐷 = 1. 0392(0.119e+0.97)
1. 39 
– 1. 
9
 In the calibration, in order for (6) to hold, the value of F needs to be adjusted to 0.119 in the same manner as 
done before.  
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The two effects together create the two steady states that we observe in the model.10 This is 
in line with the findings of Xie (1994) and Zhang (2013), who prove the existence and (in-) 
stability of multiple equilibria, if “the external effect of human capital in goods production is 
sufficiently large” (Xie, 1994). Finding a realistic combination of the most important 
parameters is of utmost importance for a good policy decision in the presence of multiple 
steady states. 
   
 
         
                        𝑎) 𝛾 = 1, 𝜖 = 0.834          𝑏) 𝜖 = 0, 𝛾 = 0.268  
Figure 3 – Case Study for 𝜸 and 𝝐 
4 Empirical Analysis  
Because of the importance of the empirical details for policy under multiple steady states 
this section provides some empirical insights into the relationship between the growth rate 
of the dependency ratio and the time spent in education as defined in the model. This 
section will show that the optimal response to a changing dependency ratio, calculated 
above and captured in Figures 1 and 2, also holds empirically. If this were not the case, we 
should have used different parameter values. So far, there is no readily constructed data to 
display the variable time spent in education, 𝑒𝑡, nor for the growth rate of the dependency 
ratio, 𝑔1+𝐷, as displayed in the model. Consequently, the steady state relation has not yet 
been estimated to this extent. This section will first provide insights into the construction of 
the data before the steady state relation will be estimated. 
4.1 International Panel Data 
The dependency ratio displays the relation of the non-working to the working population. It 
gives an indication of how many people in the economy need to be supported by the 
workforce. The higher the dependency ratio, the more people need to be supported. In 
many data sources the dependency ratio is typically referred to as the dependence between 
                                                          
10
 Combining the two cases 𝜖 = 0 and 𝛾 = 1 leads to solution-problems in (12d)I. There is no variable to ensure 
equality because only exogenous variables are left.  
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age groups, indirectly making very specific assumptions about the relation between age and 
employment. The age-dependency ratio of e.g. the OECD and the World Development 
Indicators is defined as the number of people of age 65 and older over the number of people 
between 15 and 64 years of age. This reveals several assumptions: (i) children under the age 
of 15 are not working (typically engaged in education), (ii) people between the ages 15 and 
64 are engaged in production and (iii) the retirement age is 65 years. A look at the official 
retirement ages in OECD countries shows that assuming a universal retirement age at 65 is 
not accurate enough.  
 
Australia 65,0 Hungary 60,0 Norway 67,0 
Austria 65,0 Iceland 67,0 Poland 65,0 
Belgium 60,0 Ireland 65,0 Portugal 65,0 
Canada 65,0 Italy 59,0 Slovak Republic 62,0 
Czech Republic 61,0 Japan 65,0 Spain 65,0 
Denmark 65,0 Korea 60,0 Sweden 65,0 
Finland 65,0 Luxembourg 60,0 Switzerland 65,0 
France 60,5 Mexico 65,0 Turkey 44,9 
Germany 65,0 Netherlands 65,0 United Kingdom 65,0 
Greece 57,0 New Zealand 65,0 United States 66,0 
OECD average 63,0     
Table 2 – Official Retirement Ages in the OECD 
Source: National officials, OECD calculations and Turner (2007) 
Table 2 shows that the official retirement ages range between 44.9 years in Turkey and 67 
years in Iceland and Norway. The difference of 22.1 years is too big to be neglected. There 
are many ways in which the ratio of dependency can be redefined. See Quesada and García-
Montalvo (1996), Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2014)  and Hammer et al. (2015) for an overview 
of different definitions and their importance. To calculate the dependency ratio as defined in 
the model, the active and inactive parts of the population need to be identified. The active 
population, in line with the model, is divided into two parts; the active workforce ((1 −
𝑒𝑡)𝐿𝑡) and people in education (𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑡). We include both into the active population because 
we want to focus on the allocation of time between working and schooling as in the model. 
The rest is the non-active population, i.e. children before attending school, retirees, 
unemployed and other people. We have data for 16 countries11. For the entire set, data 
from 1985 to 2011 is used.  
The variable “education” is constructed as follows: It includes any kind of participation in 
educational programs. Next to the regular school career, this includes vocational training 
and on-the-job training. To identify the regular students, the OECD iLibrary (Dataset: 
Students enrolled by age) is used. This includes enrollments in ISCED levels 0-6. Some 
                                                          
11
 The countries are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and the US. We refrain from using compounded data 
(like EU, or OECD data) because it is impossible to track missing data. Since we are using absolute values, 
missing data by just one country would make a big difference. 
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countries have a dual system of apprenticeships in which students work parts of the week 
and go to school for the rest. In the available data sets, apprentices are generally counted as 
full-time students, regardless of their contribution to output. To include their contribution to 
output in our data, we account 3 days per week in education (60%) and 2 days in production 
(40%). The 40% of the production side need to be added to the data on the working 
population and subtracted from educational data. In line with the concept of lifelong 
learning, many employers provide continuous vocational training (CVT) to their employees. 
This is usually done in courses that take up a varying amount of time (a couple of hours to 
several weeks or months per year). Eurostat has conducted a survey in which they track the 
percentage of time the average employee spends in training during the year. The scope of 
continuous vocational training has been measured in two years (2005 and 2010). We use the 
2005 data as a markup for prior years. The time spent in CVT will be added to education and 
subtracted from employment. Unfortunately this data is only available in Europe. We use UK 
data as estimate for the time spent in CVT in three non-European countries, Australia, USA 
and Canada.  
To calculate the growth rate of the dependency ratio, the variable 𝐿𝑡 (the active population) 
is constructed by adding people in education and in production. Together with the total 
population (𝑁𝑡) the dependency ratio can be calculated with the relation used in the model,  
𝐷𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡−𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡
. To stay in line with the model, we calculate the growth rate of the activity ratio 
(1 + 𝐷𝑡) in the same way as in the discrete-time model, to ensure comparability:  
𝑥𝑡+1
𝑥𝑡
= 1 +
𝑔𝑥.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The average growth rate of the activity ratio, 𝑔1+𝐷, over the whole sample starting 1985 to 
2010 for 16 OECD countries is −0.001 , with data ranging from −0.062  to 0.059 . 
Temporarily the growth rate of the activity ratio may be quite low or high, but the panel 
mean over the last 25 years is close to zero. A temporarily diverging growth rate of the 
dependency ratio from zero is important to analyze transitions from a younger to an older 
population, but in the long run, the dependency ratio may be stable. The variable education 
has a panel mean of 0.344, ranging between 0.284 and 0.518 for the countries’ cross-section 
mean. The real interest rate, 𝑟𝑡, is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
ranges between -0.025 and 0.146 with a mean of 0.056. In most European countries this 
data series is only available until the early 2000s. Only for the non-European countries and 
Italy, the Netherlands and the UK the time range until 2010 is available. The growth rate of 
the population, 𝑔𝑁, is also taken from the WDI. It ranges between -0.004 and 0.029.  
4.3 Empirical Model and Results 
As in the theoretical model above, our focus lies on the steady state relation (12d)II, which is 
the equation we would like to estimate. As mentioned above, it is not possible to solve for 𝑒𝑡 
or its growth rate. Hence, we estimate an approximation in logs. If (12d)II could be solved, 
the resulting equation would most probably not be linear in the expressions for interest 
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rates, population growth and dependence. Therefore, linear, quadratic and cubic terms are 
used in the estimation, because polynomials of the third degree have enough flexibility to 
capture many forms of non-linearity. To allow for some flexibility, 4 models have been 
estimated with stepwise elimination of the most insignificant variables after the first 
estimation. Model 1 uses the polynomials of the third degree for all variables and Model 2 
does so only for the education variable in natural logs and is linear in the logs of the other 
variables of equation (12d)II. Models 3 and 4 are obtained from stepwise elimination of the 
insignificant variables: 
Model 1 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)) + 𝑐2  (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)))
2
+ 𝑐3 (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
+
𝑐4𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑐5𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑖(𝑡−1))
2
+ 𝑐6𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑖(𝑡−1))
3
+
𝑐7 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡))
2
+ 𝑐8 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡))
3
+ 𝑐9 log(1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝑐10 log(1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2 +
𝑐11 log(1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
3 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  
Model 2 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)) + 𝑐2  (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)))
2
+ 𝑐3 (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
+
𝑐4𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑐5 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑐6 log(1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
 
Model 3 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑐2  (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
+ 𝑐3 (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
+
𝑐4𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑐5 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
 
Model 4 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑐2  (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
+ 𝑐3 (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
+
𝑐4𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   
   
Table 3 – Models to be estimated 
Where 𝜂𝑖  is the unobservable individual effect and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a disturbance term and 𝜑𝑡are 
period fixed effects.  As our data fulfills  𝑇 >  𝑁, fully modified OLS (FMOLS) might be the 
most adequate estimation procedure, assuming cointegration. It would deal with 
endogeneity, contemporaneous correlation and serial correlation through a data 
transformation (see Baltagi (2008) chap.12). However, its usage leads to a loss of data, 
leaving only 9 or even less countries in the sample. Instead, we use the System GMM 
method. It estimates two equations simultaneously, namely the given equation estimated in 
levels, but instrumented with their first-differences and the given equation in first-
differences, instrumented with their levels, or, alternatively in orthogonal deviations. It is 
applied because the lagged dependent variable (log (𝑒𝑡−1)) is correlated with the error term 
by definition which would lead to a downward bias of 1/𝑇 for a fixed effects estimator 
(Nickell, 1981). With the 24 periods in the given sample, this leads to a bias of 
1
24
= 0.042. All 
4 models are estimated using the orthogonal deviations12 version of System GMM, which 
replaces the difference equation by one subtracting a weighted sum of future residuals from 
the current residual (see Arellano and Bover (1995)). We use one instrumental variable per 
                                                          
12
 Using orthogonal deviations reduces the loss of data, when faced with sporadically missing data (Roodman, 
2009a) 
 Optimal Education in Times of Ageing  
19 
 
regressor, the second lag for the lagged dependent variable and the first lag for the other 
regressors, in line with Okui (2009), who suggest this for very short panels.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1))  0.607 
(0.0855)*** 
14.070 
 (5.883)** 
 
14.869 
(5.730)** 
15.830 
 (5.773)*** 
(log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
   13.402 
 (5.992)** 
 
14.741 
  (5.979)** 
15.683   
 (6.044)** 
(log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
   4.467 
 2.017)** 
 
5.078 
(2.049)** 
5.386 
 (2.076)** 
log(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)(𝑡−1))   0.167 
 (0.093)* 
 
0.414 
 (0.121)*** 
0.429 
 (0.124)*** 
(log(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
  5.150 
(3.181) 
   
log(1 + 𝑔𝑁(𝑡−1))   -0.876  
 (0.606) 
-0.634 
 (0.748) 
 
(log(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡)))
2
  -414.339 
(156.536)*** 
 
   
(log(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡)))
3
   13230.62 
(7325.986)* 
   
log(1 + 𝑟𝑡)   0.145 
(0.1363) 
   
(log(1 + 𝑟𝑡))
2  2.208 
(1.248)* 
   
S.E. of regression 0.016 0.015 0.022 0.023 
Instrument Rank 50 51 52 51 
J-statistic 22.599 34.923 22.312 21.580 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.425 0.039 0.501 0.580 
Cross sections 14 14 16 16 
Periods 1988-2010 1988-2011 1988-2011 1988-2011 
Obs. 159  158 235 235 
Table 4 – Estimations with Panel Generalized Methods of Moments, Transformations: Orthogonal Deviations 
Note to table: In Models 1 and 2 the countries Luxembourg and Portugal are lost because data is not matching. 
The few observations, compared to the time frame and cross sections available, are due to many asymmetrically missing 
values. 
Instruments: Model 1: log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)) , (log(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)(𝑡−1)))
2
, (log(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
, (log(1 + 𝑔𝑁𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
, (log(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1))
2    
              Model 2: log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)), (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)))
2
 , (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)))
3
, log(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)(𝑡−1)), log(1 + 𝑔𝑁(𝑡−1)) , log(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) 
       Model 3 log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)), (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)))
2
, (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)))
3
, log(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)(𝑡−1)), log(1 + 𝑔𝑁(𝑡−1))  
       Model 4 log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)), (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)))
2
, (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)))
3
, log(1 + 𝑔(1+𝐷)(𝑡−1))  
 
After having dropped the other insignificant regressors in Model 1, we find that the squared 
growth rate of the dependency ratio is just insignificant. If we also drop it, the other 
variables become insignificant as well and this version of stepwise regression collapses.13 For 
the linear Model 2, we find that interest rates are most insignificant. Dropping them leads to 
                                                          
13
 Using current or lagged values of the regressors does not improve this result. 
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Model 3 where the population growth rate is insignificant. Dropping that one also leads to 
Model 4, in which all variables are significant. The p-values of the J-statistic indicate that it is 
not too high (or p-values too low) to have a chi-square distribution (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 2004), except for the first regression where p is too low, because of a low 
number of observations. Otherwise we would cast doubt on the instruments or the 
specification. They also indicate that the p-values are not too high (or the J-statistic too low), 
which would indicate that the over-identifying instruments are ineffective in correcting the 
bias (Roodman, 2009b). As it is significant in all variables we prefer Model 4 to compare 
Figure 1 and 2 in Section 3 with the empirical outcomes.  
Model 4 gives a specification of14 
log(𝑒𝑡) = 4.532 + 15.830 ∗ log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 15.683 ∗ (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
+ 5.386 ∗ (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
+
0.429 ∗ log(1 + 𝑔1+𝐷𝑖𝑡)  
 
For a comparison with Figure 1 the model needs to be solved for the growth rate of 𝑒𝑡. With 
1 + 𝑔𝑒 =
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑒𝑡
↔ log(1 + 𝑔𝑒) = log(𝑒𝑡) − log(𝑒𝑡−1) ≈ 𝑔𝑒 this becomes: 
log(1 + 𝑔𝑒) = 4.532 + (15.830 − 1) ∗ log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 15.683 ∗ (log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
+ 5.386 ∗
(log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
+ 0.429 ∗ log(1 + 𝑔1+𝐷𝑖𝑡)                 (14) 
 
 
This compares to Figure 1 with log (1 + 𝑔𝑒) ≈ 𝑔𝑒 on the vertical axis. Up until 𝑒𝑡 ≈ 0.45, it 
has a similar shape as Figure 1. It has a (local) maximum at 𝑒𝑡 = 0.324. The calibrated model 
of Figure 1 above shows a similar maximum at 0.354. The steady state values are 𝑒1 =0.294 
and  𝑒2 =0.367 comparing to the very similar ones of the calibration in Figure 1,  𝑒1 = 0.305 
or 𝑒2 = 0.380 in Figure 1. This approximately confirms the calibrated values by estimation, 
with impacts of interest rates and population growth rates close to zero though. If both of 
these were significant instead, interest rates would shift the curve up and population growth 
rates would shift it down. If we use Model 2 instead, the steady-state values are 𝑒1 = 0.263 
and 𝑒2 = 0.359, which are very similar again. Only few data points have higher values of 𝑒 
than 0.45, they mostly belong to Ireland and to a lesser extent to Spain. This is an indication 
that the upward trend above educational shares of 45% per cent may not be relevant. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 The constant is the average of country-specific intercepts, not reported in Table 4 (see Greene (2008) for the 
procedure of calculation). Bun and Windmeijer (2010) state that the variance of the fixed effect should be 
similar to the variance of the regression. A simple check shows that the ratio in our case is  
(0.0226)2
(0.0223)2
 = 1.0271 
for Model 4, which is close to unity, which was used in the Monte Carlo simulation studies underlying the 
validity of System GMM. 
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Figure 4        Figure 5 
To show the relation to Figure 2, 𝑔𝑒 is set to zero and (14) is solved for 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑡. 
  
𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑡 =
4.532+(15.830−1)∗log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1))+15.683∗(log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
2
+5.386∗(log(𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)))
3
−0.429
  
 
This is plotted in the 𝑔(1+𝐷) − 𝑒𝑡 plane. 
Figure 5 relates to Figure 2, with 𝑔(1+𝐷)𝑡 on the vertical axis. Up until 𝑒𝑡 ≈ 0.45, this has a 
similar shape as Figure 2, with a minimum at 𝑒 = 0.324 and the same roots as Figure 4, 
𝑒1 =0.294 and  𝑒2 =0.367. The panel of the 16 countries shows a similar structure as the 
simulation of the model in Figure 1 and 2. This shows, as the first major result of this section, 
that the choice of parameters is in line with Lucas (1988). Specifically 𝐹, 𝛾 and 𝜖 of the model 
were close to the mark, whereas other models, without externalities are not.15 If our choices 
for parameters values leading to Figures 1 and 2 had not been realistic Figures 1 and 4 as 
well as 2 and 5 would differ much more from each other. Before getting this empirical 
support we could not have excluded the possibility that the empirical figures might have 
looked like those of Figures 3 a or b. 
In the theoretical framework, we were forced to do two case studies of either setting 𝑔𝑒 =
0, or 𝑔1+𝐷 = 0 for analytical reasons. The empirical model allows us to include both cases of 
the theoretical framework. The second major finding of this section is that whereas an 
increase in the growth rate of population shifts the 𝑔𝑒 − 𝑒 curve in Figure 4 downward, an 
increase in the growth of the dependency ratio and the interest rate shift the curve upward 
leading to a faster second best growth rate of 𝑒𝑡 in the transition to the steady state and a 
higher steady state value. By implication, the second-best policy response to ageing is more 
                                                          
15
 See Figure 3b for graphical representation of the case without externality. 
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education for more human capital and productivity growth.16 This partial result holds for a 
constant interest rate, which will be treated as endogenous next.   
5 Debt Dynamics and general equilibrium   
In sections 3 and 4 one of the assumptions has been a zero elasticity of the interest rate with 
respect to the debt ratio,  𝜂𝑟𝑏 = 0, and thereby a fixed interest rate given by the world 
market because a small and open economy has been considered. This assumption was made 
in order to postpone the discussion of feedback effects of changes in 𝑒 on those of the 
debt/GDP ratio and the interest rate 𝑟, which would have an effect on the 𝑔𝑒 − 𝑒 relation 
according to equation (12d)II and Figure 1, although the estimated model shows that this 
effect is insignificant and therefore at best small. If the elasticity is assumed to be zero in 
some sub-sections, this feedback effect on the interest rate is interrupted and partial 
equilibrium analysis gives adequate results. In this section this assumption will be loosened 
to a flexible interest rate for several reasons. First, price-takership taken literally requires 
countries to be atomistically small, which they never are; even if there is no attempt to 
exploit an impact on the interest rate, a country’s impact on the world market interest rate 
can never be exactly zero. Second, EU countries have understood that each country’s 
cumulated government deficit will increase the interest rate for all of them because of the 
size effect just explained and, therefore, it is rational to consciously limit government and 
foreign debt as modeled by a higher interest rate at higher debt/GDP ratios in Bardhan 
(1967). Third, building on the first two points raised here, if a country’s debt is large, the risk 
of debt service rescheduling, moratoria or repudiation is also large, as was shown by Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981); more empirical support was obtained by Edwards (1984) and S. H. Lee 
(1991); (1993). We will follow this line of reasoning in our modelling strategy as others, cited 
below, did. It will first be shown how debt behaves in an unstable manner under a fixed and 
given interest in order to illustrate the stability problem. In a second step, the model will be 
extended to include an endogenous interest rate depending on the magnitude of debt, 
which has not been done in an Uzawa-Lucas model so far. Third, the interest-debt relation 
will be estimated. Fourth, we consider the stability of the consumption-debt dynamics with 
endogenous interest rate. Fifth, the general equilibrium effect of ageing on all steady-state 
variables of the model will be derived. 
 
5.1 Fixed Interest Rate  
This sub-section illustrates the stability problem in the presence of foreign debt. The special 
case of no effect of debt on the interest rate, 𝜂𝑟𝑏 = 0, is instructive here. In the model 
economy the current account equation must hold. It states that next period’s debt/lending 
                                                          
16
 Seeing the threat of an increasing 𝑔1+𝐷, pension funds in countries like the Sweden, Netherlands and 
Germany have announced to pay lower pensions per working year. In response to that announcement, people 
have started working more years (but not so in Austria). With more years, longer education time becomes 
profitable. In countries with less ageing or more immigration this may be different. 
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must balance the deficit/surplus in production after consumption, saving and previous 
interest payments have been accounted for. 
𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝑘)𝐾𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
)) 𝐵𝑡  (15) 
(15) is the equivalent to equation (5) with 𝜔𝑡 and 𝑟𝐾𝑡 at their equilibrium values of equations 
(3) and (4) and, hence, with  𝜔𝑡(1 − 𝑒𝑡)ℎ𝑡
𝑁𝑡
1+𝐷𝑡
+ 𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐾𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡. 
Because the previously determined relations hold, 𝐾𝑡+1  and 𝐾𝑡  can be replaced by 
𝐾𝑡+1 =
1−𝛼
𝑟(
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)(1+𝜂𝑟𝑏)+𝛿𝑘
 𝑌𝑡+1  from equation (12c) and (12b) with 𝑅𝐻𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝐵𝑡+1 = 1 +
𝑟 (
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
) (1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏) for their respective periods. The interest rate is given and constant in this 
subsection, requiring the assumption 𝜂𝑟𝑏 = 0 . If the debt to GDP ratio is defined as 𝑏𝑡 =
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
, 
then 
𝑏𝑡+1 =
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑌𝑡+1
−
𝜃
1+𝑔𝑌
+
1+𝑟
1+𝑔𝑌
𝑏𝑡    (15)
I 
Where  𝜃 = (1 − 𝛿𝑘)
1−𝛼
𝑟(1+𝜂𝑟𝑏)+𝛿𝑘
+ 1 − (1 + 𝑔𝑌)
1−𝛼
𝑟(1+𝜂𝑟𝑏)+𝛿𝑘
 < 1 and is constant in steady-
state.  
 
Figure 6 
Equation (15)I describes the development of the debt-to-GDP ratio over time for the 
previously discussed special values of the interest rate and the constant steady state growth 
rates of output and consumption, for which the slope of (15)I is constant and equal to 1.018. 
The intercept is 
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑌𝑡+1
−
𝜃
1+𝑔𝑌
. The marginal propensity to consume is constant as 𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡 grows 
at the rate (1 + 𝑔𝑁)(1 + 𝑔𝑐) = 1.031 which is the same rate as that of the denominator, 
1 + 𝑔𝑌 = 1.031. The last term of the intercept only contains exogenous variables and 
b
b1
𝑏𝑡 
𝑏𝑡+1 
𝑏∗ ∗ 
𝑏∗ 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡+1 
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑌𝑡+1
−
𝜃
1 + 𝑔𝑌
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parameters and the growth rate of output which is constant in steady state. These special 
assumptions for only this sub-section boil down to a partial equilibrium analysis and imply a 
stable average propensity to consume and a stable intercept. Because the slope is larger 
than unity, 𝑏∗ is an unstable steady state value, indicating that any deviation from the steady 
state value cannot lead back to 𝑏∗ if all other parameters are unchanged. It leads to ever 
increasing debt if the process starts to the right of 𝑏∗as described by Blanchard (1983) using 
the Cass-Koopmans model. Without extra assumptions about jumping to 𝑏∗ or adjustment of 
the magnitude of the marginal propensity to consume, no conclusions about the value of 𝑏∗ 
can be drawn. For higher consumption rates this would imply lower debt-GDP ratios, 
because with higher consumption there is less money for debt services; the current account 
surplus would be lower. However, in general the dynamics in 𝑏 show an unstable steady 
state because of the parameter choices. For different parameter choices, especially 𝜎 and 𝛽, 
the average propensity to consume is not constant anymore. If 𝜎 = 2 and 𝛽 = 0.97, the 
growth rate of consumption is 0.009 instead of 0.029, which leads to a decreasing average 
propensity to consume as the numerator grows with (1 + 𝑔𝑁)(1 + 𝑔𝑐) = 1.011 and the 
denominator with 1 + 𝑔𝑌 = 1.031. The intercept of the debt to GDP function (15)’ thus 
becomes more and more negative causing an outward shift of the debt to GDP line with no 
steady state. By implication, a jump onto a certain value of the debt/GDP ratio cannot be a 
general solution to the stability problem and more adjustment is needed. If the interest rate 
increases in 𝑟, removing the zero-elasticity assumption, the slope increases with increasing 
debt/GDP ratio, which would aggravate the stability problem. 𝜃 would increase, moving the 
line to the left, which would also destabilize the process. Adjustment then must mainly come 
from decreasing the consumption share, because changes of education shares 𝑒 and effects 
from 𝑒 on 𝑔𝑌 are small. 
5.2 Endogenized interest rate 
Section 5.1 shows the solution to the model as an unstable steady state for one specific 
parameter set. With a constant interest rate it would have been possible to keep borrowing 
to finance infinite consumption, implying that no utility maximum exists. However, an 
interest rate depending on the debt to GDP ratio avoids this problem of infinite consumption 
and stabilizes the unstable debt process and acts as a borrowing restriction as assumed in 
the literature (Bhandari et al., 1990; Hamada, 1969; Philippopoulos, 1991). Therefore, to 
analyze the dynamics around the steady state it is useful to assume a non-fixed interest rate 
which depends on the debt of the country. In this case of a model extension, the interest 
rate depends on the world interest rate ?̅? and the spread of the interest rate which in turn 
depends on debt over GDP, 𝑟(𝑏𝑡) = ?̅? + 𝑟𝑠(𝑏𝑡). To our knowledge this is the first time that 
an empirically founded endogenous interest rate has been introduced to an Uzawa-Lucas 
model. In this subsection we will first understand how the creditor chooses the lending rate 
for a specific country and then find an expression for 𝑟(𝑏𝑡) that holds empirically which will 
then be introduced into the model at hand.  
5.2.1 The creditor chooses the lending rate  
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So far, the exact function for 𝑟(𝑏𝑡) has not been specified. To see how the schedule for the 
creditor’s specific lending rate (𝑟) behaves, we need to go more into depth on how the 
creditor chooses the lending rate. The creditor is assumed to maximize his profit in a 
competitive market. His profit is the revenue he gets, 𝑟𝑐𝐵, times the repayment probability 
𝑝(𝑏) minus the cost. It is assumed that 𝑝(𝑏) is decreasing in 𝑏 since it is more difficult to 
repay if the debt/GDP ratio rises. The creditors costs are the world market interest rate 
times the debt issued, ?̅?𝐵. Because the payback probability of the country may be less than 
one under a temptation to repudiate, the interest charged, 𝑟𝑐, may be higher than the world 
interest rate. The creditor then maximizes:  
max𝐵    𝑝(𝑏)𝑟𝑐 𝐵 − ?̅?𝐵   
Where 𝑝(𝑏) is the probability of debt repayment, ?̅? is the world interest rate and 𝑟𝑐 is the 
lending rate of the creditor. The first-order condition is 𝑝(𝑏) 𝑟𝑐 + 𝑝
′(𝑏)𝑟𝑐
𝐵
𝑌
− ?̅? = 0 which 
can be solved for the lending rate of the creditor: 
  𝑟𝑐 =
?̅?
𝑝(𝑏)[1+𝜂𝑝𝑏]
   
with 𝑏
𝑝′(𝑏)
𝑝(𝑏)
= 𝜂𝑝𝑏 < 0  as the elasticity of the repayment probability to debt per GDP. The 
lending rate formula shows the supply schedule for debt if the creditor maximizes profit in a 
competitive market. If debt per GDP increases, the probability of payment decreases and 
hence the optimal lending rate increases, given a constant elasticity 𝜂𝑏𝑝. Subtracting the 
world market interest rate from the lending rate yields  
𝑟𝑐 − ?̅? =
?̅?
𝑝(𝑏)[1+𝜂𝑝𝑏]
− ?̅?  
The spread is equal to the right-hand side. In case of a competitive creditor’s market, the 
profits covering some fixed costs are expected to be zero. Then it follows from the definition 
of non-negative profits, that  
𝑟𝑐 −
?̅?
𝑝(𝑏)
> 0  
The left-hand side of the spread formula is even larger under positive profits. 
Under costless perfect information the creditors may also take the debt dynamics (15)I into 
account. However, in practice country studies are expensive and it is cheaper to know only 
the value of the debt/GDP ratio as sufficient information in our model, which is sufficiently 
simple to allow linking it to the Uzawa-Lucas growth model. If 𝑟𝑡 is a suitable function of 𝑏𝑡, it 
is constant in the steady state with constant 𝑏. 
5.2.2 Estimation of the interest-debt relation 
The basic idea in this section and the related literature is that interest rates increase with the 
debt/GDP ratio either because the country has a large market share in the capital market 
 Optimal Education in Times of Ageing  
26 
 
(Bardhan, 1967) or because higher debt relative to the potential to pay the debt service 
increases the risk of financial problems. Whereas this is widely accepted, the second and 
third derivatives of the relation are discussed much less and often imposed by mere 
assumption. Theoretically, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) balance the risk compensation against 
the increase of the probability being unable to pay, leading to credit rationing. In the model 
of the previous section, the interest rate is linear in that of the world market, but the 
probability to pay debt service has a negative relation with the debt/GDP ratio. Second order 
conditions are more likely to be fulfilled if the second derivative is also negative in particular 
for low values of the interest rate. But this is less necessary under higher interest rates, and 
the Stiglitz-Weiss argument would say that the second-derivative should be decreasing when 
debt/GDP is high. Thus, second derivatives may be changing and third derivatives are likely 
to increase them from negative to positive. In order to solve our endogenous growth model 
we need an estimate for the same countries for which we have considered education data. 
We chose a cubic specification because it is very flexible and allows for changing signs of 
derivatives. Assume a positive transformation of log[1 + 𝑟𝑡] = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 log[1 + ?̅?] +
𝑐3 log[2 + 𝑏𝑡] + 𝑐4(log[2 + 𝑏𝑡])
2 + 𝑐5(log[2 + 𝑏𝑡])
3 , which may balance the consumption 
reduction effect and the partial instability of b(b(-1)) dynamics. Adding the quadratic and 
cubic term is an empirical decision for a non-linear effect. In order to not lose any of the 
already scarce data, the measurements have been adapted. We chose to regress on 
log(1 + 𝑟𝑡) instead of log(𝑟𝑡), because 𝑟𝑡 ranges between -0.025 and 0.146 and some of the 
data would be lost if log(𝑟𝑡) was employed. For the same reason log(2 + 𝑏𝑡) has been used 
in the model as 𝑏𝑡 ranges between −1.6 and 1.7. 
For the variable 𝑏𝑡we choose the measure “Net foreign debt” from the updated and 
extended version of the dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) . It accounts 
for a country’s assets held within and outside of its borders, where a positive value indicates 
a borrowing position of the country and a negative value a lending position. The interest 
rate, 𝑟, is taken from the World Development Indicators (as above). ?̅? is approximated by the  
interest rate of the United States, 𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐴, which is 0.05 on average. This way, the part of the 
movement of the world interest rate which is not caused by debt movements of the specific 
country is accounted for by the movements in the US interest rate.  
We apply Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) estimation method to the data. 
Phillips and Hansen (1990) first propose the FMOLS estimator as a consistent estimator for 
time-series samples with high endogeneity and serial correlation. The cointegrated panel 
estimator is also consistent for small samples with contemporaneous correlation of the 
residuals (Pedroni, 2004). It is implemented taking into account fixed effects by de-meaning 
regressors by country averages as in the within estimator.  
Testing for cointegration between the interest rate and debt yields mixed results. We 
conduct the Pedroni (1999) test for cointegration in panel data, which is Engle-Granger 
(1987) based. Eight of the 11 tests are significant, leading to a rejection of the null 
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hypothesis of “no cointegration” in all but three cases. Because the other tests with the 
same hypothesis show very low p-values and the number of observations is low, 
cointegration between the two variables can be assumed.17  
The estimated equation is reported below. With the truncated-uniform kernel18, the 
regression shows the highest adjusted R² and the most significant estimates. The estimation 
has an adjusted R² of 0.1196 and a DW statistics of 0.6035. Both values are not satisfactory, 
but given the scarcity of the available data, this is the best possible. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the estimate.  
log[1 + 𝑟𝑡] = −0.204 + 0.566 log[1 + ?̅?] + 0.605 log[2 + 𝑏𝑡] − 0.564(log[2 + 𝑏𝑡])
2 
                                    (0.002)∗∗∗  (0.041)∗∗∗                    (0.038)∗∗∗                    (0.049)∗∗∗   
+0.214(log[2 + 𝑏𝑡])
3  
   (0.059)∗∗∗        (16) 
 
With this specification the development of the interest rate with respect to the debt to GDP 
ratio is  
 𝑟(𝑏𝑡) = 0.815𝑒𝑥𝑝
−0.564 log[2+𝑏𝑡]
2+0.214 log[2+𝑏𝑡]
3
(2 + 𝑏𝑡)
0.605(1 + ?̅?)0.566 − 1  (16)I  
 
which is displayed in Figure 7.  
Implementing 
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡 in (15)
I together with (12b) it must hold that  
(1 + 𝑔𝑏) =
1
1+𝑔𝑦
(
1
 𝑏𝑡
𝑋𝑡 −
1+
1−𝛼
𝑟(𝑏𝑡)(1+𝜂𝑟𝑏)+𝛿𝑘
((1−𝛿𝑘)−(1+𝑔𝑦))
𝑏𝑡
+ 1 + 𝑟(𝑏𝑡))  (17) 
 
                                                          
17
 The variable log (2 + 𝑏𝑡) shows the existence of a unit root with and without a trend added. The variable 
log(1 + 𝑟𝑡)  shows a unit root if no trend is added, but with an added trend there is mixed evidence. 
18
 Estimating the long-run covariances using the Bartlett kernel with automatic bandwidth choice of Newey-West 
or Andrews yields very similar results. 
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Figure 7 
In steady state, 𝑔𝑏 = 0 and (17) solved for 𝑋𝑡 becomes 
𝑋𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔𝑌 − (1 + 𝑟(𝑏𝑡))) 𝑏𝑡 +
(1−𝛼)(1+𝑔𝑦)
𝑟(𝑏𝑡)(1+𝜂𝑟𝑏)+𝛿𝑘
(
(1−𝛿𝑘) 
1+𝑔𝑌
− 1) + 1   (17)I  
With 1 + 𝑔𝑌 = (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
1+
𝜖
𝛼
(
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
) and 𝜂𝑟𝑏, the elasticity of the interest rate 
with respect to the debt to GDP ratio that is derived from (16)I with 𝜂𝑟𝑏 =
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑟′(
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)
𝑟(
𝐵𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
)
.    
𝜂𝑟𝑏 =
𝑏𝑡 (
0.494𝑒𝑥𝑝−0.564Log[2+𝑏𝑡]
2+0.214Log[2+𝑏𝑡]
3
(1+r̅) 0.566
(2+𝑏𝑡)0.395
+
0.815(2 + 𝑏𝑡)
0.605𝑒𝑥𝑝−0.564Log[2+𝑏𝑡]
2+0.214Log[2+𝑏𝑡]
3
(1 + r̅)0.566 (−
1.127Log[2+𝑏𝑡]
2+𝑏𝑡
+
0.642Log[2+𝑏𝑡]
2
2+𝑏𝑡
)) ∗
1
(−1 + 0.815(2 + 𝑏𝑡)0.605𝑒𝑥𝑝−0.564Log
[2+𝑏𝑡]2+0.214Log[2+𝑏𝑡]3(1 + r̅)0.566)⁄
  
(17)I is plotted in the in the 𝑏 − 𝑋 plane in the left-hand panel of Figure 8 for the steady 
state value  𝑒 = 0.380 and the previously stated parameter set. 
For (15)I which is as in the previous section, the dynamic equation describing 𝑏𝑡, to hold, not 
only the dynamics in 𝑒𝑡 are important, but also those of the average propensity to consume. 
Defining  
𝑁𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑌𝑡
= 𝑋𝑡, 1 + 𝑔𝑋  by definition is  
1 + 𝑔𝑋 =
(1+𝑔𝑁)(1+𝑔𝑐)
1+𝑔𝑌
=
1+𝑔𝑁
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+(1−𝛿ℎ))
1+
𝜖
𝛼(
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
)
[𝛽(1 + 𝑟(𝑏𝑡)(1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏))]
1
𝜎 (18) 
2 1 0 1 2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
b
r𝑟 
𝑏 
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Where 1 + 𝑔𝑌 is its steady state relation and 1 + 𝑔𝑐 is derived from (7) and (9)
I. In steady 
state 𝑔𝑋 = 0, with the expression for 𝑟(𝑏) of equation (16),  (18) becomes:  
1
𝛽
((𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+ (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
1+
𝜖
𝛼 (
1
1+𝑔1+𝐷
))
𝜎
= (1 + 𝑟(𝑏𝑡)(1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏)) (18)
I 
This cannot be solved analytically for either 𝑏𝑡 or 𝑒𝑡 and hence is plotted as  𝑔𝑋 = 0 line in 
Figure 8 for the assumed values of the parameters.  
The dynamics of 𝑔𝑒 are given by equation (12d)
II, where 𝑅𝐻𝑡+1 = 1 + 𝑟(𝑏𝑡)(1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏) from 
(12bI). In steady state 𝑔𝑒 = 0, then together with the estimation for 𝑟(𝑏𝑡), (12d)
II becomes  
1 + 𝑟(𝑏𝑡)(1 + 𝜂𝑟𝑏) = (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+ (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
 𝐹𝛾 [𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
− 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+ 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 1
𝛾
+
(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]    (19) 
(19) shows all steady state combinations of 𝑏𝑡 and 𝑒𝑡 for the given parameter set with ?̅? set 
to 0.05, the average over the sample. It cannot be solved analytically for either 𝑏, or 𝑒. To 
analyze the relationship further, it has been plotted below in the 𝑏 − 𝑒 plane for the 
parameters assumed in Table 1. The 𝑔𝑒 = 0 - line in the right panel of Figure 8 represents all 
steady state pairs of 𝑏 and 𝑒.  
Both lines intersect at 𝑒 = 0.380 and 𝑏 = 0.042. This implies an 𝑋𝑡 of 0.693  and an 𝑟 of 
0.050.  
 
   
Figure 8 
 
5.3 Partial Stability with Endogenous Interest Rate 
In sections 5.1-5.3 the existence of a steady state in the case of an endogenized interest rate 
has been analyzed. This section will deal with the behavior of the economy out of the steady 
state and will analyze aspects of the stability of the system. 
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There are three mutually interacting variables that influence the dynamics: 𝑒𝑡, 𝑏𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡. The 
central equations are (12d)II for the dynamics in 𝑒𝑡, (15)
II for the dynamics in 𝑏𝑡 and (18) for 
the dynamics in 𝑋𝑡. Figure 1 in Section 3 shows the dynamics in 𝑒𝑡 if 𝑟 is a function of 𝑏𝑡 and  
𝑏𝑡 is constant. For given 𝑏𝑡 it has already been established, that the steady state value 
𝑒∗ = 0.380 is stable.  
Figure 9 shows the partial stability in 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑏𝑡. The vertical line represents equation (18) for 
𝑔𝑋 = 0 and hump shaped line is (15)
II for 𝑔𝑏 = 0. Where both lines intersect, for given 𝑒𝑡, the 
sub-system is stable in the saddle-point sense. If only 𝑏𝑡 is off the 𝑔𝑋 = 0-line in Figure 9, a 
larger (smaller) value of 𝑏𝑡 implies a positive (negative) growth rate of 𝑋𝑡 in (18). This is 
shown in the vertical movement-arrows. If 𝑋𝑡 is larger (smaller) than its steady state value in 
(15)II, 𝑔𝑏 becomes positive (negative). This is captured in the horizontal arrows above and 
below the 𝑔𝑏 = 0-line. The arrows indicate that there is a saddle-point-stable trajectory. If 
the economy starts on this trajectory with given 𝑒𝑡, 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑏𝑡, it ends up in steady state. If 
the economy started to the right of this trajectory, debt would keep growing which violates 
the transversality condition. If the economy started on the left, it would move towards the 
origin, indicating that less is consumed than possible. This is also not optimal. Hence, the 
only optimal solution is to jump right on the saddle-point-stable trajectory.  
 
Figure 9 
This shows the partial stability of the system for all three variables. To achieve stability 𝑋𝑡 
has to control 𝑏𝑡 directly as in Figure 9 and via 𝑏𝑡 also 𝑒𝑡 indirectly as in Figure 1.  
 
5.4 The Influence of the Growth Rate of the Dependency Ratio 
So far, we set 𝑔1+𝐷 = 0 . We are interested in what happens if the growth rate of the 
dependency ratio changes. For this we exemplarily plot 5 scenarios. Since the data of 𝑔1+𝐷 
ranges between -0.062 and 0.059 with an average of −0.001, the scenarios are chosen for 
the values -0.06, -0.03, 0, 0.03 and 0.06. From (18)I it follows that for given 𝑏, a higher 
𝑔1+𝐷 shifts the gX=0-line to the right. From (19) it follows that for given 𝑒, the 𝑔𝑒 = 0 −line 
shifts down. The latter move dampens the increase in 𝑒∗ from the first, and the former 
𝑋 
𝑏 
𝑔𝑏 = 0 
𝑔𝑋 = 0   
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dampens the fall in  𝑏∗. Whether these dampening effects even dominate can only be 
answered numerically. The same holds for 𝑋𝑡 because the 𝑔𝑏 = 0-line was drawn for steady-
state values 𝑏∗ and 𝑒∗. The answer is given in Table 5.    
 
𝑔1+𝐷 𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑡 𝑋𝑡 𝑟𝑡(1 + 𝜂) 1 + 𝑔𝑐 
-0.06 0.331 0.721 0.672 0.117 1.091 
-0.03 0.354 0.351 0.674 0.082 1.059 
0 0.380 0.042 0.693 0.050 1.029 
0.03 0.407 -0.151 0.738 0.020 1.001 
0.06 0.437 -0.276 0.887 -0.009 0.975 
Table 5 – Summary of Influence of Changes in 𝒈𝟏+𝑫 
With an increasing growth rate of the dependency ratio, the optimal time spent in education 
increases substantially. The optimal debt to GDP ratio decreases, indicating the need for 
different optimal practices when expecting ageing, and the interest rate decreases. The 
marginal propensity for current consumption increases and the growth rate of consumption 
decreases. Hence, the optimal reaction to ageing and the implied higher consumption is 
more education at the cost of consumption growth, leading to less credit demand and a 
lower interest rate, implying a lower burden of debt service.  
 
In terms of figures, we can summarize the effect of the growth rate of the dependency ratio 
on education 𝑒, debt ratio 𝑏 and consumption ratio 𝑋 as follows, using the outcomes of 
Table 5 when several forces pull into opposite directions. First, in Figure 1, representing 
equation (12d)’’, an increase in 𝑔1+𝐷 shifts up the curve in figure 1 and 𝑒 moves to the right. 
g1+D also has the effect of moving the vertical line in Figure 9 for stationary 𝑋, equation (18), 
to the left, resulting in lower 𝑏. This is mitigated but not outweighed by the increase in 𝑒. 
𝑔1+𝐷   has no direct effect on the other inverted U-shape line in Figure 9. But the increase in 
𝑒 decreases the slope and increases 𝑋 shifting the line upward, resulting in higher 𝑋 at lower 
𝑏. The lower values of the debt/GDP ratio 𝑏 and interest rate 𝑟 feed back into equation 
(12d)II decreasing 𝑔𝑒 for given 𝑒 and therefore dampening the initial effect of 𝑔1+𝐷 on 𝑒. 
However, as 𝑒 is increasing according to Table 5, the feedback effect on 𝑒 must be smaller 
than the initial effect, which is also in line with the insignificance of the interest term in 
model 2 of the regressions in Table 4. In short, ageing leads to higher education, more 
growth, and a lower debt/GDP ratio, a lower interest rate, a lower debt service and, if strong 
enough, turning into net interest income, and a lower growth rate of consumption and a 
higher level of consumption, where the latter happens to occur because of pulling forward 
the benefits of higher growth to early periods with more old people.      
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have seen the consequences of an increasing age-independent dependency 
ratio introduced into a discrete-time Uzawa-Lucas model with international capital 
movements, human capital externalities and decreasing returns to schooling time in human 
capital formation. The model has been calibrated and compared to estimates; it shows 
patterns, which are similar to the education data of sixteen OECD countries since 1985. The 
economy turns out to have multiple steady states.  Steady-state analysis has shown that only 
a high share in education is associated with a stable steady state. In the neighborhood of the 
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stable steady state, it is optimal to spend more time in education when the growth of the 
active part of the population lags behind that of the inactive part as it is the case in times of 
ageing. This increases the growth rates of human capital, GDP per capita, wages, and 
reduces the growth rate of consumption, interest rates and the debt/GDP ratio in order to 
reduce the burden of debt service. As a model extension and to ensure stability and non-
exploding debt, the interest rate function has been estimated to cope endogenously with 
increasing debt.  
In a broader perspective, when the process of ageing has started, it is important to care for 
the future. Higher education is one option that shifts the value of time via education as a 
store of value and technical change into the future. In principle, this could also be done 
through saving earlier or borrowing later. However, ageing in a utility maximizing framework 
requires keeping consumption high and therefore capital accumulation is not an attractive 
option, neither via saving early nor borrowing later. This holds at least under the specific 
assumptions of our model regarding decreasing returns to education time in human capital 
formation and education externalities in final output production. Therefore we have taken 
care of empirical properties of our model in the analysis.  
Our infinite horizon approach avoids modeling decisions of generations separately. 
Therefore the recent emphasis of some literature on life-expectancy does not appear here. 
Once the life-expectancy discussion has included capital accumulation with international 
capital movements and fully endogenous technical change for ageing economies both 
approaches can perhaps be matched to further explore the effect of ageing on education. 
Similarly, decisions on retirement age do not appear in our model. Households can decide to 
let old or young people work longer. Explicit modeling of working time of young people is 
intimately related to union contracts. Working time of old people is related to those of 
pension fund rules, which differ per country. When unemployment is higher than the natural 
rate the suggestion for later retirement may be less convincing. Moreover, retirement 
decisions are ‘undermined’ by decisions to resume work after retirement (Kanabar, 2015) 
and by escape clauses for certain types of work leading to decisions of early retirement. 
These decisions are often softer rules than in the models. Therefore we leave this as a 
within-household decision. But, of course, if modeling approaches are able to capture 
heterogeneity of leisure preferences and labour market institutions this would lead to an 
enrichment of models and new possibilities to re-investigate our result suggesting enhancing 
education time. It would be in line with the life expectancy argument that later retirement 
makes education even more useful, provided retirement is not a perfect substitute for other 
labour market decisions, in case they capture all effects.19  
As the literature discussed in the introduction has shown, also institutional aspects like those 
of health, education, labour markets, and capital markets are important. To the extent that 
family support and student loans are insufficiently available to achieve sufficiently much 
                                                          
19
 See Warren (2015)  on some complements and substitutes for retirements. 
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education as assumed in Hansen and Lønstrup (2012) governments should improve the 
student loan system. Student loans do not only benefit the recipient families but also allow 
for the optimal response to ageing. Similarly, country specific market imperfections and 
institutions should be improved where ever it is beneficial.   
A natural next step for future research would be to introduce more information on the 
growth rate of the dependency ratio. Furthermore, it would be interesting to use other 
endogenous growth models than that of Uzawa-Lucas. For the question whether or not 
there should be more education in reaction to ageing other models can only be those which 
do have endogenous human capital formation. Moreover, they need a clear empirical 
perspective regarding scale effects - defined as growing growth rates when factor 
endowments grow – and also regarding semi-endogenous growth - defined as zero growth 
when there is no population growth. We have avoided both of these extreme views because 
we think that the Lucas model is empirically more realistic. However, neither of these two 
alternative model classes has been entirely rejected by the literature, but the more well-
known ones do not have endogenous human capital formation. Any such effort should 
combine calibration and estimation of models in order to ensure empirical robustness as far 
as possible.  
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APPENDIX A 
This Appendix shows the proof for the existence of maximum value of the utility integral for 
𝜎 > 0 in steady state. The utility function has a finite integral, and hence has an interior 
maximum, if the growth rate of discounted utility is smaller than zero (𝑔𝑢 < 0).  By 
definition,  the growth rate of the individual utility function is 1 + 𝑔𝑢 =
𝑢𝑡+1
𝑢𝑡
= 𝛽
𝑐𝑡+1
1−𝜎
𝑐𝑡
1−𝜎 =
𝛽(1 + 𝑔𝑐)
1−𝜎 ↔  𝑔𝑢 = 𝛽(1 + 𝑔𝑐)
1−𝜎 − 1. For a positive growth rate of 𝑐, σ > 1 is sufficient.  
APPENDIX B 
In this appendix, the derivation of equation (13), the derivative of (12d)II is shown. 
Denote the RHS as 𝐽(𝑒, 𝑔(𝑒)) and differentiate implicitly with 𝑔′(𝑒) = −
𝐽1
′ (𝑒,𝑔(𝑒))
𝐽2
′ (𝑒,𝑔(𝑒))
: 
Calculate partial derivatives w.r.t. 𝑔𝑒 and 𝑒𝑡: 
𝑱𝟏
′ (𝒆, 𝒈𝒆) =
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
 𝐹𝛾 ( 
𝜖
𝛼
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼
−1
𝐹𝛾 𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1 [𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1 − 𝑒𝑡
𝛾(1 + 𝑔𝑒) +
𝑒𝑡
𝛾 1
𝛾
(1 + 𝑔𝑒) + (
1
1+𝑔𝑒
)
𝛾−1 (1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
] + (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼
[(𝛾 − 1)𝑒𝑡
𝛾−2 − 𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1(1 + 𝑔𝑒) +
𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1(1 + 𝑔𝑒)])      
𝑱𝟐
′ (𝒆, 𝒈𝒆) =
1+𝑔𝑁
1+𝑔1+𝐷
 𝐹𝛾 (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼 [−𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 1
𝛾
+ (1 − 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑒)
−𝛾 (1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]    
The ratio of the two partial derivatives is the derivative of 𝑔𝑒 w.r.t. 𝑒𝑡.  
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𝒈𝒆
′ = −
𝑱𝟏
′ (𝒆,𝒈(𝒆))
𝑱𝟐
′ (𝒆,𝒈(𝒆))
= −
𝜖
𝛼
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+(1−𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼
−1
𝐹𝛾 𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
[𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
−𝑒𝑡
𝛾
(1+𝑔𝑒)+𝑒𝑡
𝛾1
𝛾
(1+𝑔𝑒)+(
1
1+𝑔𝑒
)
𝛾−1(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+(1−𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼[−𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+𝑒𝑡
𝛾1
𝛾
+(1−𝛾)(1+𝑔𝑒)
−𝛾(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]
−
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+(1−𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼[(𝛾−1)𝑒𝑡
𝛾−2
−𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
(1+𝑔𝑒)+𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
(1+𝑔𝑒)]
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+(1−𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼[−𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+𝑒𝑡
𝛾1
𝛾
+(1−𝛾)(1+𝑔𝑒)
−𝛾(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]
            
This can be simplified, by cancelling (𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ))
𝜖
𝛼
: 
𝑔𝑒
′ = −
𝐽1
′ (𝑒,𝑔(𝑒))
𝐽2
′ (𝑒,𝑔(𝑒))
=
−
𝜖
𝛼
(𝐹 𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+(1−𝛿ℎ))
−1
𝐹𝛾 𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
[𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
−𝑒𝑡
𝛾
(1+𝑔𝑒)+𝑒𝑡
𝛾1
𝛾
(1+𝑔𝑒)+(
1
1+𝑔𝑒
)
𝛾−1(1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]−[(𝛾−1)𝑒𝑡
𝛾−2
−𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
(1+𝑔𝑒)+𝑒𝑡
𝛾−1
(1+𝑔𝑒)]
[−𝑒𝑡
𝛾
+𝑒𝑡
𝛾1
𝛾
+(1−𝛾)(1+𝑔𝑒)
−𝛾 (1−𝛿ℎ)
𝐹𝛾
]
      
 
APPENDIX C 
In order to find reasonable values for 𝐹 and 𝛾 to fulfill the condition (6), 𝑔ℎ is set to 0.011 
with 𝛿ℎ being fixed at 0.03. This can only be done for given 𝑒𝑡. We choose 𝑒𝑡 to reflect the 
panel average of the data in section 4: 𝑒𝑡 = 0.344.  
Gong et al. (2004) suggest estimated values for 𝛾 and 𝜖 which differ substantially from ours. 
The reason may be that they include an exponent on individual human capital in (6), which is 
smaller than unity, as opposed to 1 in our model. Such a specification might change the 
estimated values for 𝛾 and 𝜖 and leads actually to a semi-endogenous growth model as in 
Jones (1995). Lower values of 𝜖, as in Gong et al. (2004), only have one steady state. 
Moreover, they use different education data for their estimation than we do. As seen in Xie 
(1994), in the absence of depreciation though, 𝜖 should be “large enough” to observe two 
steady states. Section 4 shows evidence for two steady states in the data and Figure 3a and 
3b show sufficient conditions for uniqueness. We pick 𝐹 = 0.055 and 𝛾 = 0.268, because it 
ensures the closest fit to Figure 5  in Section 4.  
APPENDIX D 
This appendix shows that a decrease in the depreciation rate of human capital only 
marginally affects the results. We set 𝛿ℎ = 0.01, then according to (6), 𝐹 and 𝛾 need to be 
altered to ensure a close fit to the data, 𝑔ℎ  =  0.011 for 𝑒 =  0.344 as in the text. Below 
are Figures 1 and 2 for 𝛿ℎ = 0.01, 𝐹 = 0.035 and 𝛾 = 0.436. All other parameters used in 
the derivation of Figures 1 and 2 are unchanged. 
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                 Figure D.9 – Dynamics in 𝒆𝒕       Figure D.10 – Growth rate of the activity ratio 
While the upper (stable) steady state is close to the empirical value again (𝑒 = 0.380 in this 
version of the calibrated and 𝑒 = 0.367 in in the estimated model), the lower steady state is 
a little further off (𝑒 = 0.214 in this version of the model vs. 𝑒 = 0.294 in the estimated 
model). The calibrated model in the text with 𝛿ℎ = 0.03 gave the same upper value for e, 
and the lower value 𝑒 = 0.305  is closer to that of the estimated model at 0.294. In short, 
with 𝛿ℎ = 0.03 instead of 0.01, the calibrated model is closer to the estimated model at the 
lower steady state.  
To make Figure D.3 compatible with the model (and comparable to Figure 8), 𝛽 needs to be 
adjusted marginally from 0.982 to to 0.984. Otherwise the 𝑔𝑒 = 0 and the 𝑔𝑋 = 0 lines do 
not intersect in the steady state.  
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The steady state values for the variables 𝑏, debt per GDP, and 𝑋, the marginal propensity to 
consume, change only marginally. The change in variable 𝑏 is only visible if the precision is 
increased by one decimal. It decreases from 0.0418 in the case of 𝛿ℎ = 0.03 to 0.0416 in the 
case of 𝛿ℎ = 0.01. The marginal propensity to consume decreases from 𝑋 = 0.693 in the 
case of 𝛿ℎ = 0.03 to 𝑋 = 0.683 in the case of 𝛿ℎ = 0.01. 
